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John: ‘Everyone says they were happy 20 years ago’. 
Karen: ‘I think in some ways though life was just simpler. I think all this choice and 
stuff...’ 
Arun: ‘...has just complicated things’.
1
 
 
 
1). The proliferation of choice 
‘Choice’ has become a keyword in public policy debate in the United Kingdom, perhaps 
even ‘the mantra of health, education and pension provision’.2 This coincides with the 
emergence of ‘the consumer’ as the privileged figure of policy discourse. The assumption 
underlying this proliferation of choice in policy discourse is that consumerism has 
transformed people’s expectations, so that public services must now be restructured in 
line with the demands of citizen-consumers who demand efficiency, responsiveness, 
choice and flexibility. The ubiquity of the choice paradigm can be interpreted as the 
outcome of a determined effort to recast the balance of responsibility between the state 
and citizens. What has been dubbed the ‘personalisation agenda’ now ‘stretches right 
across government’, encompassing health initiatives and pensions policy.
3
 The stated 
aims of this agenda is to reframe the role of state-led initiatives in terms of empowering 
individuals to make informed choices, based on information provided by government. 
Choice is in turn presented as a means of making service-providers more responsive to 
the variegated needs of citizens. One can see this individualization of responsibility in a 
number of fields, extending beyond the realm of the state as such. For example, the 
individualization of health risks has also been associated with the burgeoning of socio-
cultural practices such as the growth of the fitness industry, self-help publishing, and 
lifestyle media. In the realm of business, concerns over both health and environment have 
led to increasing attention being given to the labelling of food products. The discursive 
individualization of responsibility around various ‘risks’ or hazards related to personal 
health and environmental futures leads to considerable faith being invested in the role 
that information can play in empowering citizens to pursue their own goals in a way that 
is conducive to just collective outcomes in markets.       
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The proliferation of choice in policy discourse and public debate does not, of course, go 
uncontested. There is a well established line of liberal-left criticism that sees the 
extension of the logic of choice into more and more areas of public and private life as 
part of a much more pernicious tendency, whereby the ‘triumph of the market’ has 
plummeted us into the ‘age of selfishness’:  
‘The marketisation of everything has made society, and each of us, more competitive. 
The logic of the market has now become universal, the ideology not just of 
neoliberals, but of us all, the criterion we use not just about our job or when shopping, 
but about our innermost selves, and our most intimate relationships. The prophets who 
announced the market revolution saw it in contestation with the state: in fact, it proved 
far more insidious than that, eroding the very notion of what it means to be human. 
The credo of self, inextricably entwined with the gospel of the market, has hijacked 
the fabric of our lives. We live in an ego-market society’.
4
  
For all its critical overtones, this kind of lament does nothing to question taken-for-
granted assumptions about how markets work, and about how consumers operate in them. 
In public policy debates, as well as in broader public debates about globalisation, 
neoliberalism, and privatization, there is a polarisation between being for or against ‘the 
market’. The shared assumption that underwrites the arguments of both market-
proponents and market-critics is that markets are individualising, egoistical and self-
interested:  
‘Consumers are therefore distinctive in the way they make choices (as self-regarding 
individuals), receive goods (through a series of instrumental, temporary and bilateral 
relationships with suppliers), and exercise power (passively, through aggregate 
signalling)’.
5
  
This critical description mirrors the positive normative ideal of a certain kind of 
economic liberalism. Proponents of the market think that people should act like this, 
despite lots of evidence that they don’t. Critics of the market tend to assume that people 
do act like this, perhaps increasingly so, but they think that they ought not to, and 
therefore intone them to act more responsibly.  
 
2). The ethical problematization of everyday consumption 
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Standard critiques of consumerism tend to obscure what is most distinctive about the 
ways in which discourses of choice currently circulate in policy and public debates, by 
accepting at face value that ‘choice’ is simply a matter of egoistical self-interest 
promoted by rampant neo-liberalism. To get a better handle on what it at stake in the 
proliferation of ‘choice’ discourses, it might be better to think not in terms of what 
theorists of governmentality call ‘advanced liberalism’. This theme better captures the 
internal relationship between discourses of individual choice and discourses of individual 
responsibility without reducing this ‘synapsis’ to an ideological function of a singular 
logic of capitalist reproduction. Nikolas Rose argues that the prevalence of the register of 
consumerism has its roots in the ‘de-socialisation’ of modes of governing, whereby it 
becomes possible to govern people by regulating the choices made by autonomous actors 
in the context of their everyday, ordinary commitments to friends, family and 
community. Consumption becomes a new vector for governing society ‘through the 
‘responsibilized’ and ‘educated’ anxieties and aspirations of individuals and their 
families’.
6
 On this understanding, consumption is transformed into a medium for making-
up ethical selves, not in the sense of conforming to externally imposed codes of conduct 
in the name of collective good, but in the sense of ‘the active and practical shaping by 
individuals of the daily practices of their own lives in the name of their own pleasures, 
contentments and fulfilments’.
7
 From this perspective, discourses and practices of 
consumerism are central to this programme of responsibilization.  
 
The governmentality approach emphasises that the articulation of ‘choice’ and 
‘responsibility’ is the result of the efforts of a diverse set of actors pursuing plural ends. It 
throws light upon the redistribution of responsibility between states, markets, and 
individuals in a number of fields: ‘So whereas in the domain of health a discourse of the 
'unhealthy Western' lifestyle has moved towards an individualized monitoring of health 
risks (with all the practices that come with it, such as fitness, healthy food and self-
monitoring), the environmental sphere sees the emergence of individualization of food 
risks through the introduction of labelling and web-based information services’.
8
 From 
this perspective, the proliferation of consumer choice is indicative of the modularisation 
of a new rationality of governing through individualization. The exercise of choice 
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becomes a basic element of ‘the subjective meaning of consumption for the ordinary 
individual in their everyday life’.9 In this move, the very nature of individuality is 
transformed along the lines of consumer choice, so that individuals are thought of as ‘not 
merely ‘free to choose’, but obliged to be free, to understand and enact their lives in 
terms of choice’.
10
 Individuals are, it is argued, reconfigured by being offered an identity 
as ‘consumers’:  
‘In the name of themselves as consumers with rights they take up a different relation 
with experts, and set up their own forms of ‘counter-expertise’, not only in relation to 
food and drink and other ‘consumables’, but also in relation to the domains that were 
pre-eminently ‘social’ – health, education, housing, insurance and the like’.
11
  
Experts – advertisers, market researchers, psy-experts of various sorts – become crucial 
to this new regime of conduct, acting as ‘concerned professionals seeking to allay the 
problems, anxieties and uncertainties engendered by the seemingly so perplexing 
conditions of our present. They operate a regime of the self where competent personhood 
is thought to depend upon the continual exercise of freedom, and where one is 
encouraged to understand one’s life, actually or potentially, not in terms of fate or social 
status, but in terms of one’s success or failure acquiring the skills and making the choices 
to actualise oneself’.
12
  
 
There is a trend towards using the analytics of advanced liberal governmentality to 
bolster Marxian analysis of neoliberalism. This marriage of convenience depends on a 
particular understanding of how macro-level changes need to be sutured into everyday 
life by bringing off coherent ‘interpellative’ subject-effects at the level of individuals. On 
this reading, the proliferation of discourses of ‘choice’ is just part of a broad hegemonic 
agenda of neoliberal restructuring, whereby elites reconfigure formations of subjectivity 
in line with the structural requirements of de-regulated, liberalised markets. This 
argument holds that extending the range of activities that are commodified, 
commercialized and marketized necessarily implies that people need to be re-tooled and 
re-worked in order to recognise themselves as responsible consumers, entrepreneurial 
subjects, and active participants.  
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This chapter develops an alternative account of the relationship between discourses and 
practices of choice and responsibility. Rather than assuming that governing is mediated 
through interpellative subject-effects, we look instead at how efforts at governing 
consumption engage creatively with people’s existing dispositions. This conceptual focus 
upon dispositions rather than subjectivities follows from the empirical observation that 
far from ‘choice’ being straightforwardly championed and promoted, it is increasingly 
circulated as a term in policy discourse and public debate by being problematized. In 
short, the problem of how to ensure that the choices of putatively free individuals are 
exercised responsibly – in terms both of those individuals’ own good and the good of 
broader communities – has become a recurrent theme of contemporary public debate. For 
example, choice is problematized in terms of the potential of increased individual choice 
to conflict with public interest goals of sustainability and conservation; in terms of 
increased choice leading to greater anxiety and reduced quality of life, even reduced 
levels of happiness; in terms of the likelihood of choice increasing or even maintaining 
equity in social provision and access to public services. In short, choice circulates as a 
term of public debate only in and through this register of responsibility for the self and 
for others; this is what a standard interpretation of ‘neoliberalism’ misses what is most 
distinctive about the contemporary discourse of choice, which focuses less on questions 
of choice as a vehicle of efficient allocation than it does on concerns with legitimacy, 
trust, and capacity building.   
 
The problematization of choice is most evident in current debates about smoking, obesity, 
and other health related issues in which the extension of choice in consumer markets is 
seen to lead to deleterious effects not just on individuals but also on the fabric of 
collective life itself. In this set of debates, the concern is with how to ensure that the 
exercise of choice does not impact negatively on the consuming self. Our focus in this 
chapter is with a distinct, although related set of debates in which issues of choice are 
related to a set of more anonymous, other-regarding concerns with environment 
sustainability, global warming, and social responsibility. We critically assess the 
discursive field populated by a set of think-tanks and consumer organisations including 
The Future Foundation (a commercial think tank dedicated to understanding the future of 
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consumerism); the New Economics Foundation (a sustainable economy think tank); the 
Co-Operative Bank (which has its own distinctive ethical stance on social responsibility 
and ecological sustainability); the National Consumer Council (a lobbying group for all 
consumers); The Green Alliance (a think tank on sustainable development); and the 
Fabian Society (a political think tank). All of these organisations regularly engage in 
public debates about consumption, sustainability, environmentalism, and social 
responsibility. And it is here that one can discern a distinctive mode of problematizing 
choice as a means of recasting the responsibilities of consumers in collective rather than 
individualising ways. We argue here that in so far as the normative discourse of markets 
and consumerism is rhetorically associated with paternalist discourses of responsibility, 
then this problematization of choice involves a double movement in which the 
individualization of responsibility opens up new possibilities for collective action through 
the medium of markets and the repertories of consumerism. 
 
The analytics of governmentality throws light upon important aspects of contemporary 
consumption practices. But as Bevir and Newman also argued in their chapters, it tends to 
neglect issues of agency. In particular, it tends to assume that the subject-effects implied 
or aimed for by programmes of rule actually come-off in practice. There is something a 
little too neat about the shift in modes of governing that this approach identifies; for all 
the emphasis on ‘contingent lash-ups of thought and action’, there is a strong sense that 
projects aimed at governing conduct actually work. This observation certainly implies the 
need for more ‘dialogic’ approaches to the relationships between programmes of rule and 
practices of subject-formation.13 But more than this, it requires a reconsideration of 
whether these sorts of programmes do, in fact, aim for interpellative subject-effects at all. 
By taking a ‘dispositional’ approach to the analysis of governing people’s practices, we 
develop the idea that consumption is increasingly constructed as an arena for the ‘ethical 
problematization’ of various aspects of people’s activities. This notion of ethical 
problematization directs analytical attention to investigating the conditions ‘for 
individuals to recognize themselves as particular kinds of persons and to reflect upon 
their conduct - to problematize it - such that they may work upon and transform 
themselves in certain ways and towards particular goals’.
14
 If consumerism is indeed an 
 8 
important contemporary political rationality, then it works not through the promotion of 
unfettered hedonism and self-interest, but by making problematic the exercise of 
consumer choice in terms of various, ever proliferating responsibilities and ethical 
imperatives. We argue that people are increasingly expected to treat their consumption 
practices as subject to all sorts of moral injunctions: they are expected to do so through 
their capacity to exercise discretion through choice; in the everyday activities of social 
reproduction mediated through commodity consumption; and in relation to a very wide 
range of substantive concepts of the good life.  For example, the Ethical Consumption 
Research Association (ECRA), which publishes the Ethical Consumer magazine, 
explicitly addresses its readers as political actors who use their daily purchasing as votes 
to register their approval for certain objectives and to help make corporations 
accountable. Here, consumer choice is presented as medium of ‘democratised morality’,
15
 
in the sense that people now have choice about their own moral conduct and principles, 
and with this comes ‘need to make their own decisions, rather than follow established 
norms’. Here, then, we can see the process of ethical problematization of consumer 
choice made explicit: choice is presented not just as a medium for the expression of 
moral preferences, but as the very mechanism through which people  constitute 
themselves as moral agents in the first place.   
 
In the rest of this chapter we focus on two aspects of the problematization of 
consumption and consumer choice. In Section 3, we examine policy documents on public 
service provision, think tank reports on sustainable consumption, consumer reports and 
research polls on ethical consumers, and campaign materials of ethical consumerism 
organisations. We identify a distinctive discursive register in which consumers are 
addressed as bearing responsibility both for their own choices and the effects of their 
choices on others. But this is not simply a matter of exhortation. It reflects an explicit 
concern with rethinking the ‘the art of influencing’
16
 consumer behaviour by deploying 
various practical devices and strategies: education campaigns, through learning about and 
utilising network hubs, through labelling and certification campaigns, through linking 
consumption purchases to opportunities to engage in campaigns. What can be discerned 
in this field is an emergent rationality that holds that the best way of influencing people’s 
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dispositions is to deploy the classical arts of persuasion. This finding is relevant for both 
how we conceptualize the rationalities behind the ethical problematization of 
contemporary consumption, and also for how we might go about empirically 
investigating ordinary people's engagements with these interventions in ways that do 
justice to their own competencies as persons, and not just subjects. In Section 4, we draw 
on focus-group research on ethical consumerism to explore the forms of routine 
reasoning that ‘consumers’ engage in when confronted with a proliferating range of 
potential acts of responsible choice.  
 
3). Making the ‘ethical consumer’ visible 
From the perspective of purist economic liberalism, each person is seen as a sovereign 
actor determining their own conception of the good, and pursuing these by means of 
simple means-end rationality in the market place. It is worth noting that what one might 
dub ‘Third-Way’ invocations of the market and consumer choice differ significantly from 
this purist position. For example, one recent think-tank report on public services argues 
that there is no homogenous sense of the social good or the public interest, and goes so 
far as to suggest that ‘the catch-all term citizen is unhelpful when it assumes there is a 
homogenous ‘citizen interest’.
17
 But these sorts of arguments are not invoked to support 
an unfettered individualism. Quite the contrary, the ‘personalisation’ agenda is premised 
on the assumption that extending choice is the primary mechanism for ensuring that 
service providers will be responsive to the diverse needs of individuals and groups. This 
perspective also entrains a particular understanding of ‘democracy’, one which privileges 
respecting people’s preferences if these are properly informed choices, and assumes in 
turn that preferences are effectively expressed in the choices made in markets or 
surrogate markets. Consumer choice, in this ‘market populist’ paradigm, is a mechanism 
for reconciling the equally compelling concerns of individual ‘aspiration’ with pluralistic 
conceptions of the public good. In this paradigm, then, people are understood less as 
‘citizens’ responsible for the public interest, and rather as ‘consumers, stakeholders or 
individuals concerned with the wider public interest’.
18
  
 
This approach is, of course, open to all sorts of criticisms. As Clarke argues, choice is 
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much more complex and variegated than the market-based model tends to suggest:   
‘We formulate many choices in our lives that never come near to the market-place, 
and we have many modes of trying to realise such choices (power, negotiation, 
seduction, compromise, collaboration, brute force, emotional manipulation, voting, for 
example’.
19
  
The limitations of the prevalent conceptualisation of choice in public policy have, in fact, 
become a focus of attention in a range of recent interventions by think-tanks and NGOs 
engaged in debates about public policy. It is here that one can identify a distinctive 
problematization of choice, one that accepts certain precepts of the prevalent paradigm, 
but that reinterprets them in ways that amount to a more thorough-going ‘collectivization’ 
of practices of consumer choice. 
 
What emerges from this field of discourse is a figure of the ‘citizenly consumer’, 
actively choosing, indeed choosy, in the marketplace, but not necessarily on narrowly 
self-interested grounds at all. Consumers are described with attributes usually associated 
with citizens. For example, the Ethical Purchasing Index (EPI), produced annually by the 
Co-Op and the New Economics Foundation, presents consumers as ‘influential, 
proactive and engaged’,
20
 as supporting their communities by shopping locally, and as 
acting as citizens by rewarding companies with records of good practice.
21
 The EPI is 
used to engage with a range of audiences: the general public, key retail stakeholders, and 
policy makers and government departments. The EPI is both a ‘catalogue’ that measures 
ethical consumerism in order to lobby these actors, and thereby also a ‘catalyst to its 
growth’.22 The EPI is an example of an initiative that combines an emphasis on 
consumer choice with an argument for new forms of government regulation. Consumer 
choice in a range of ‘ethical’ product markets is reinterpreted by these organisations as 
an expression of a broad public feeling in favour of certain sorts of collective goals that, 
on its own, consumer choice in the market cannot secure: consumer choices therefore 
need to be empowered not only with ‘information’, but also by explicit intervention and 
endorsement by government in the form of regulatory interventions: consumers pull, 
producers push and governments endorse.23  
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‘Choice’ in the EPI is, then, more than simply an aggregated market signal; it is 
discursively re-framed as bearing other, more overtly political preferences. Here we see 
‘choice’ being reconfigured as a dimension of civic engagement. In the process, the 
multiplicity of motivations that are collected under the umbrella of ‘choice’ are 
unpacked:  
‘most people would support people’s right to choose – if not on health principles, then 
on moral or efficiency ones’.
24
  
In practice, choice might be exercised on all three of these grounds – health, morality, or 
efficiency – in the course of any simple set of activities like the daily shop.25 Campaign 
organisations and think-tanks produce a variety of typologies of the ‘consumer’ that, 
when taken together, are indicative of a broadly shared concern to better understand the 
diverse motivations that lay behind ‘consumer’ choice. In particular, there is an 
increasing concern to differentiate the ‘ethical’ motivations that shape consumer choice. 
For the Fairtrade Foundation, ethical consumers might be ‘activists’ (persuaders and 
supporters), or ‘regular’ ethical purchasers, or ‘infrequent’ ethical purchasers. For the Co-
op, consumers might concentrate on ‘looking after own’ or ‘doing what I can’; they 
might be members of the ‘brand generation’, ‘conscientious consumers’, or ‘global 
watchdogs’.
26
 Business studies researchers are more blunt: ethical consumerism is 
divided between the ‘die hards’ and the ‘don’t cares’.
27
 These exercises in categorisation 
are not purely ‘academic’; they are put to work in the public realm to make visible the 
motivations that are hidden by thinking of consumer choice simply in terms of market 
signalling.  
 
If choice circulates in the public realm by being problematized, and if it is increasingly 
problematized in a register of responsibility, then it also seems that consumer choice is 
open to re-inscription in terms which re-legitimise forms of collective intervention in 
markets. We have already seen one version of this re-inscription - the ‘thin’ New Labour 
version in which choice is understood as a mechanism for ensuring more responsive 
modes of public service provision, conceptualised primarily in terms of principal-agent 
relations. Here the burden of ensuring that individual and collective outcomes are 
achieved is, indeed, thrown squarely on the consumer:   
 12 
‘If greater choice and control is extended to consumers, individuals must be prepared 
to take on more responsibility for the consequences of those choices.’28   
‘[T]he public will be increasingly required to take responsibility for ensuring the 
public interest is balanced against individual needs’.
29
  
Just how this ‘responsibility’ is to be enforced is left unsaid.  
 
Another version of the re-inscription of ‘consumer choice’ is evident in the 
problematization of individual choice as bearing within it all kinds of ‘risks’, whereby 
rolling-out mechanisms of choice to ensure more efficient service provision carries with 
it the likelihood that people will be allowed too much freedom to make bad choices. It is 
this concern that is evident in some of the interventions surrounding diet, obesity, and 
smoking:  
‘our ‘freedom’ of choice is conditioned in newly unhelpful ways which misdirect our 
energies, and, as a result, individuals who make self-maximising choices often end up 
inadvertently minimising themselves instead. […] The significance of prevailing value 
frameworks is heightened today by the fact that we are now being drawn to make 
choices that may not obviously impact on the freedoms of others or clearly injure the 
common good […] but which are bad for us as individuals.’
30
  
Here, choice is re-framed as an inherently uncertain mechanism, just as likely to rebound 
on the individual as it is to undermine wider collective goals.31 And it is on these grounds 
that a renewed justification of regulatory intervention to enable and enhance ‘genuine’ 
choice is developed. For example, a Fabian pamphlet suggests that there are numerous 
ways in which the same needs or wants can be met, through devices called ‘choice sets’.  
A choice set is conceptualised as a collection of interconnected acts of consumption, the 
behaviour that comes with them and the production and infrastructure that supports them. 
Each choice set excludes or precludes other choices and options, so that ‘there is no such 
thing as a purely ‘individual’ act of choice: we always choose within a choice set’.
32
 The 
argument is that individual rational choices do not necessarily lead to ‘collective goods’, 
as individual choices may circumvent or alter choices available to others. Here, then, we 
see a more explicit combination of discourses of individual responsibility with proactive 
arguments in favour of state and non-state intervention in the regulation and 
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configuration of systems of provision.  
 
This more assertively ‘citizenly’ model of consumer choice forms part of a repertoire of 
narrative storylines mobilised by a range of organisations, including think-tanks such as 
the New Economics Foundation, Fabian Society, Food Ethics Council, Demos, Green 
Alliance, Future Foundation; consumer groups such as the National Consumer Council 
campaign groups such as Ethical Consumer Research Association and the Fairtrade 
Foundation; and development charities such as Christian Aid and Oxfam. These 
organisations do not form a coherent ‘movement’; they campaign around different issues, 
have different organisational forms and membership bases; and focus on diverse goals, 
from public services to sustainability to global trade justice. Nonetheless, we can discern 
a family of related concerns around consumer choice and markets amongst this range of 
organisations. In debates around sustainable consumption, for example, choice is 
reconfigured in relation to ‘institutional contexts’
33
 and ‘social scaffolding’
34
. The idea 
that information is all that is required to ensure effective market supply in response to 
consumer demand for cleaner, fairer, greener products is increasingly rejected in these 
debates. Instead, it is argued that the key to effective change lies in providing 
infrastructures that support sustainable practices combined with a degree of ‘self-binding’ 
constraint arrived at through regulating choice-sets. The consumer-citizen is seen as a 
rational agent mobilised by information and educational devices only if these are 
accompanied by changes in the institutional settings and infrastructures of consumption. 
This reframing of choice and responsibility in more collective directions is typified by the 
2006 report of the Sustainable Consumption Roundtable, an initiative of the National 
Consumer Council and the Sustainable Development Commission. Entitled I Will If You 
Will, the report argues that a ‘critical mass’ of citizens and businesses is waiting to act on 
the challenge of sustainability, but that it is constrained from doing so through lack of 
effective government support and direction.
35
 The report is underwritten by the claim that 
expecting individuals or businesses to act ‘sustainably’ on the basis of isolated decisions 
is ineffective because neither set of actors has any sense of contributing to collective 
change. The report is indicative of a marked shift in thinking on sustainable consumption 
away from a focus only on the responsibilities of consumers. It emphasises instead the 
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proactive role of government in providing leadership and creating ‘a supportive 
framework rather than exhorting individuals to go against the grain’.36  
 
These interventions challenge the assumption that consumer choices in markets are 
equivalent to democratically expressed preferences that need necessarily to be respected. 
Between them, this set of organisations is engaged in a broader public debate concerning 
the scope of what Goodin refers to as ‘permissible paternalism’.
37
 While some of the 
arguments made for state regulation are made on non-paternalistic grounds (i.e. in the 
name of the harms that certain patterns of individual choice bring about on other actors), 
what lies behind the discussions of institutional contexts, choice-sets, and social 
scaffolding is the claim that market choices are not necessarily a means of expressing 
preferences that deserve democratic respect at all. And the arguments mustered in support 
are not simply about a lack of proper information invalidating people’s choices. In part, 
the argument which is made is that these choices express deeper preferences that are only 
made visible through acts of interpretation. In part, arguments address the degree to 
which people have the ‘volitional’ will to make the choices that they would, in fact, 
prefer to make. The exemplary case of this type of justification for paternalistically 
preferring some form of substituted judgement for the expressed preferences of ordinary 
people is that of addiction. It is noteworthy in this respect just how much of the debate 
about responsible, sustainable and ethical  consumption invokes a rhetoric of being 
‘locked-in’ and ‘addicted’ to challenge narrow concepts of choice, information, and 
preferences. We can see, then, that in these interventions, the meaning and significance of 
‘choice’ is contested around an axis that holds that democratic governance should 
respond to and respect people’s preferences. Two things are at stake in these debates: 
how to glean just what these preferences are, and just which preferences should be 
respected and which ones can be paternalistically substituted.   
 
 
 
4). (Ir)responsible consumers or sceptical citizens?   
We have so far suggested that far from being straightforwardly championed, ‘choice’ 
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circulates in public culture through being problematized by policy-makers, pundits, and 
professors. Above all, choice is problematized in a register of ‘responsibility’: personal 
responsibility certainly, but also responsibility for a whole variety of broader goals, such 
as the public interest, community, environmental conservation, or the alleviation of 
global poverty. The problematization of choice is part of a broader ethical 
problematization of everyday consumption, in which people are increasingly subjected to 
all sorts of demands that they should treat ordinary practices like the weekly shop, their 
journey to work, or their choice of holiday destination as bearing a number of moral 
burdens. This problematization of consumer choice might, in some cases, involve an 
element of individualization, although this is far from always the case. It certainly does 
not, however, involve the constitution of consumers as wholly self-interested egoists. In 
this section, we consider the ways in which ordinary people actually respond to this array 
of moral demands on their everyday conduct.  
 
There is already an extensive literature on how ‘consumers’ engage with campaigns 
around sustainable consumption, ethical consumerism, or environmentally responsible 
consumption. Some of this work circles around an apparent conundrum that people, when 
asked, often express support for various ‘ethical’ objectives like conservation or fair 
trade, but that their actual behaviour tends not to bear these expressed preferences out. 
The so-called ‘Attitude/Behaviour gap’ might, however, be as much an effect of a flawed 
methodological framework that supposes that ‘attitudes’ are free-standing mental states 
rather than rhetorical constructs through and through. More sophisticated research 
focuses on the ‘vocabularies of blame’ through which people apparently absolve 
themselves of responsibility for changing their consumption practices by displacing this 
responsibility onto other actors. More sophisticated still is recent research that 
acknowledges that consumers are often effectively ‘locked-in’ to certain patterns of 
consumption by the material infrastructures of modern, urban living; and that the 
commitments that people have to certain consumption behaviours might be deeply held 
emotional, affective ones that cannot be sloughed-off just like that.
38
 What all of this 
research shares is a sense that the problem when it comes to changing patterns of 
consumption is the consumer. Better understandings of the role of infrastructures and of 
Deleted: just 
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emotional commitments is still posed in a register of expertise aimed at enabling these 
obstacles to behaviour change to be overcome more effectively. The ‘content’ of 
responsibility is, in these discussions, still taken for granted.  
 
There is a certain irony here: as approaches to sustainable and ethical consumption have 
moved away from an information-led approach, they run into the problem of appearing to 
abandon the basic assumption of those information-led approaches. These do at least 
acknowledge ‘consumers’ to be competent, rational moral subjects whose preferences 
and opinions deserve some respect. In contrast, as research focuses more and more on 
finding ways of ‘motivating’ behaviour change amongst consumers, the question of how 
the conceptions of the public good that guide such interventions are defined recedes into 
the background.  
 
Research in the areas of sustainable and ethical consumption is often framed by the 
problem of motivating consumers to adjust their behaviour away from narrow self-
interest to more responsible patterns. This framing tends to accept the prevalent 
assumption that consumers are, in fact, atomistic utility maximizers, and focuses on 
finding the secret to changing this orientation. But this might seriously misjudge the sorts 
of rationalities that govern consumption. The force of critiques of consumption from 
Veblen through to Bourdieu has established the degree to which consumer behaviour is 
thoroughly social, involving questions of status, distinction and social position. This 
implies that consumption behaviour takes place not according to narrowly instrumental 
means/end rationalities, but is shaped by forms of communicative and strategic rationality 
that presume a competency in anticipating other people’s responses and feelings.
39
 And 
while critiques of conspicuous consumption and social distinction suppose that the 
positional dynamics of consumption take the form of zero-sum games, there is no need to 
suppose that the rationalities that shape consumption cannot accommodate ‘ethical’ 
criteria of various sorts. The role of ‘consumer’ might in fact lend itself just as easily, just 
as rationally, to the precepts of altruism as to those of egoism. As one of a multitude of 
consumers, any one person may conclude that their own consumption choices will have 
little chance of making any significant impact on aggregate outcomes. But this rule holds 
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just as much for their own egoistical interests as it does for any wider ‘ethical’ objective. 
The narrow pursuit of one’s narrow interests is not any more rational in markets then 
pursuing other, more ‘ethical’ outcomes: it is perfectly rational for consumers to pursue 
less self-centred goals, including acting on the basis of various ethical preferences, in so 
far as their structural powerlessness ‘frees’ them up from the rationality of narrow self-
interest.40  
 
The incessant focus on the problem of motivating consumer behaviour might, then, be 
poorly thought out on two grounds. Firstly, it might identify the wrong agents of change. 
And secondly, it might misunderstand the degree to which consumer behaviour is 
‘always already’ shaped by all sorts of concerns that are not reducible to either utilitarian 
self-interest or aestheticized self-centredness
41
. In this section, we want to broach what 
might well be an almost scandalous suggestion: what if, when people talk about 
responsibility, and especially when they assert clear, finite limits to their own 
responsibility, we were to take these assertions not as signs of something else – of deeply 
held affective investments, or as indicators of their being ‘locked-in’ to some pattern of 
behaviour – but at face value, as justified, citizenly arguments about not just who should 
be responsible but also over the scope of practices that should be problematized in this 
register of responsibility in the first place?     
 
This suggestion follows in part from a set of methodological commitments to 
understanding talk-data rhetorically,
42
 an understanding that builds on a set of theoretical 
commitments to thinking of practices of self-formation not on the post-structuralist 
paradigm of recognition and subjection but in terms of narratives, especially narratives of 
the self.
43
 These narratives hold that self-making is embedded in practices of 
accountability that ‘go all the way down’ as it were. But we also draw some support for 
approaching the question of ‘consumer motivation’ in this way from recent 
conceptualisations of this question in the discursive field we sketched in the previous 
section. The Green Alliance and Demos have recently argued that the key to influencing 
consumer choice is to better understand processes of shared learning through peer groups 
and social networks. This implies a focus on the ‘arts of influencing’, identifying and 
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recruiting 'intermediaries’ in peer networks who persuade and influence others in 
conversation: ‘behaviour spreads through conversations, social learning and peer group 
networks’, and so the aim of campaigns should be to ‘get people talking, inspire 
curiosity’.
44
 What is most interesting about this reconceptualization, one that is evident in 
other fields too, is that it recognizes the degree to which people’s ‘motivations’ are not 
individualized at all, but are embedded in networks of sociability. If think-tanks can 
acknowledge this, it shouldn’t be too much of a stretch to imagine that academic 
researchers might also start from the assumption that ordinary people are capable moral 
agents.  We need to take seriously what Sayer has called the ‘lay normativities’ of 
everyday life, which refers to ‘a range of normative rationales, which matter greatly to 
actors, as they are implicated in their commitments, identities and ways of life. Those 
rationales concern what is of value, how to live, what is worth striving for and what is 
not’.
45
 Focusing on these lay normativities implies taking seriously the things that 
‘matter’ to people when they engage with various demands and imperatives to adjust 
their own conduct in relation to norms of responsible consumer behaviour.   
 
In our research on how ordinary people relate to ethical consumer campaigns, we have 
used focus-group methodologies to investigate the 'lay normativities' through which 
people delineate the scope of activities that they are willing to problematize in 'ethical' or 
'moral' registers. Focus groups are very good at accessing data about interaction.46 It is 
this that recommends them as a means of exploring the ethical problematization of 
consumerism. In particular, focus group methodologies are effective at elaborating the 
interactive dynamics through which people negotiate various discursive positionings.47 
This process involves practices of expressing attitudes, providing factual versions of 
reality, and expressing regrets and giving justifications. They are, we would argue, an 
appropriate methodology for exploring one of the key principles of narrative accounts of 
the self, namely that taking-up or dissenting from positions is shaped by concerns of 
accountability.
48
 Wetherell suggests that in talk, people ‘display what they know - their 
practical reasoning skills and competencies’.
49
 This capacity for deliberative reasoning is 
folded into the embodied, habitual dimensions of everyday practices.50 In focus groups, 
we see people jointly considering the extent to which certain maxims do and should hold 
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for them, by taking their ordinary practices as objects of reflection.  
 
For analytical purposes we consider the discourses and campaigns around ethical and 
responsible consumerism to function as types of ‘positioning’. Positioning in this sense is 
‘vertical’. At the same time, positioning goes on along a ‘horizontal’ plane, as people 
introduce examples and topics of their own, and question or confirm each other’s train of 
thought. In terms of focus groups themselves, the role of the facilitator of the group is a 
surrogate for a vertical 'positioning' – they effectively address normative propositions 
which the participants then consider through their own interaction. And throughout the 
focus group exchanges around these sorts of topics, we find people agreeing and 
disagreeing, introducing topics into conversations as examples to consider from different 
aspects, and considering the different reasons they might have for assenting to some 
imperatives and dissenting from others.  
 
This is the methodological framework that has guided the analysis of focus group data 
collected from 10 different groups, undertaken in the first 6 months of 2004, in different 
social areas of Bristol. Here we want to use this material for illustrative purposes, to 
make two points about the ways in which discourses of consumer choice and responsible 
consumerism are worked-over by the local reasoning and situated agency of this selection 
of residents of Bristol. In particular, we draw out two themes that recur through these 
discussions. Firstly, a great deal of everyday commodity consumption has little if 
anything to do with ‘choice’, at least as this is supposed to function by proponents of the 
market, left-liberal critics, and grand sociological theory. In fleshing this claim out, we 
endorse Miller’s argument concerning the degree to which consumption practices are 
often embedded in networks of obligation, duty, sacrifice, and love; as well as the 
ordinary, gendered work of social reproduction.
51
 Secondly, we return to the ‘scandalous’ 
dimension of our analysis: we want to suggest that sometimes when people talk about 
their roles as consumers they accept that they do have certain responsibilities; sometimes 
they make excuses for not doing more; but sometimes they make pertinent sounding 
justifications for not considering it their responsibility at all; and maybe, just maybe, if 
you listen hard enough, they might be asserting finite limits to how much they, as 
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individuals, can be expected to be responsible for, and they might also be articulating 
justifiable skepticism towards the whole frame of ‘responsibility’ that is being addressed 
to them.  
 
Firstly, then, the question of the degree to which consumption is about choice, and the 
degree to which choice is reducible to the paradigm of purchasing. As we have already 
suggested, this idea might overestimate the degree to which being a ‘consumer’ is a 
strongly held point of personal identity that centres on the exercise of discrete acts of 
monetized choice. Arguments within the sustainable consumption field dovetail with 
work on the ethnography of shopping to demonstrate that lots of everyday ‘choices’ 
about what to buy have little enough to do with self-interest or personal identity, but an 
awful lot to do with obligations to others, love, care, compassion, and vulnerability. Once 
again the point of this argument is that there might be much less ‘choice’ involved in the 
conduct of ordinary activities like doing the weekly shop or buying treats for your kids.   
 
There are various ways in which the people in our focus groups indicate the dependence 
of their own consumption behaviour on the relationships in which their lives, their cares 
and concerns are embedded. Having kids made a difference to Robert, for example:  
‘My girlfriend and I had a couple of kids about 10 months ago, twins. And we buy 
more organic now cos of them so I suppose that’s changed. Maybe we would have 
done a bit before but I think now we are just thinking about what they’re eating for 
health reasons’.
52
 
Others talked about how much of their shopping was done with friends; for some women, 
this was a matter of the time available during the week when kids were at school; or on 
Saturday’s, when husbands were at the football. Participants also talked about how they 
learnt about the ‘ethics’ of different products not from formal information campaigns, but 
through social networks: from friends, from church groups, or from what their kids tell 
them about what they have learnt at school. On the other hand, it is not necessarily the 
case that people who do engage actively in ‘ethical’ shopping think of this in terms of 
having an economic impact through the market; it is just as likely to be part of a smaller, 
more modest practice of trying to influence friends and neighbours:  
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Abigail: ‘More than thinking that I can change the world if I buy a certain way I think 
I can influence the people around me, maybe my friends will see that I have bought 
fair-trade tea bags and the next time they are in the supermarket they think oh yes that 
looks nice.’
53
  
 
So ordinary everyday consumption isn’t necessarily all about personal choice in the 
marketplace. A great deal of it is embedded in material infrastructures
54
 and affective 
practices
55
 that are not appropriately described as matters of ‘choice’ at all. But nor, it 
seems, do people appreciate being constantly bombarded with information about what is 
good and bad for them – in health terms and in moral terms too. It’s far from clear that 
our focus group participants respond to all the information about products as rational 
choosers. They seem just as likely to express exasperation at all the information directed 
at them:  
‘There’s something different each week. ‘Don’t eat chicken’ this week because this, 
this, and this’.
56
  
Perhaps more fundamentally, this exasperation is often articulated in a register that seems 
to delineate the scope of ‘choice’ that people should be expected to exercise quite tightly:  
Alexandra: ‘I don’t know half of what is going on. If you knew everything that was 
going through all these different places, you wouldn’t eat’.  
Tracey: ‘If you knew all these things, everything that was going into these different 
things, you’d have a nervous breakdown wouldn’t you.  
Peter: ‘You’d starve to death wouldn’t you’.
57
  
One could, at a stretch, interpret this sort of exchange in terms of people displacing or 
denying their own responsibility, but that would seem to us to remain deaf to the tone of 
exasperation and vexation in which these sorts of points are being made. It seems just as 
plausible to interpret this exchange as expressing the limits of ‘choice’ as a plausible 
model of how people can carry on the ordinary work of everyday social reproduction. 
People’s consumption is embedded in their practices,
58
 and this means when people are 
asked to justify their consumption behaviour, they quickly turn to justifying their 
commitments and relationships – they don’t talk about being a ‘consumer’, but about 
being a parent, a friend, a spouse, or a citizen, an employee, or a professional. In turn, this 
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means that, as one of our respondents puts it, ‘you can’t carry the torch for everything’.
59
 
For Paul, any ‘ethical’ decisions about consumption followed from and fitted into his 
broader patterns of life and work.  
 
The ambivalence that people have about choice is neatly illustrated by discussions about 
the advantages of vegetable box schemes. These can be a convenient way of getting your 
veg shopping delivered to the doorstep and being ‘ethical’ in an organic way at the same 
time. Some people don’t like the lack of choice implied by these schemes:  
Carole: ‘I knew someone who has one of those boxes that you’re referring to, and 
she’s very pleased with it.’ 
Stephanie: ‘I know somebody and she’s thinking of cancelling it because they there’s 
only twp pf them and they’ve no control, over what goes in it so they get rather a lot of 
what they’ve got a lot of and sometimes it’s not always what you want.’ 
Janet: ‘They can’t specify what they want then?’ 
Stephanie: ‘No you just get a selection.’ 
David: ‘Of what’s available, yeah.’ 
Stephanie: ‘So they’re thinking of cancelling it.’ 
Carole: ‘You can choose what you want from ours.’
60
  
Here, choice does seem to be a matter of relevance to people’s attitudes towards this 
particular ‘ethical’ consumption practice. But some people appreciate the lack of choice, 
because it adds a kind of surprise and a kind of obligation to their everyday cooking 
activities:  
Michael: ‘There are veg, boxes, organic veg, boxes you can get’. 
Rachel: ‘That’s true.  Yeah, that’s true, you can just go pick it up on a Thursday night 
or whatever’. 
Nigel: ‘Which one do you get?’ 
Simon: ‘Green Wheel’ 
Rachel: ‘Any good or mouldy?’ 
Simon: ‘No it’s good, it’s ten pounds for fruit and veg for two for a week and there’s 
always potatoes, onions, carrots and then odd greens and things and enough fruit to 
last’.  
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Rachel: ‘I like the way they just arrive and you don’t have to have that thought about 
shall I buy that or not?’  
Simon: ‘It forces you to eat more fruit and vegetables’. 
Rachel: ‘Exactly…’ 
Simon: ‘Because you think I can’t chuck out...’ 
Rachel: ‘Not bloody broccoli again!’ 
John: ‘So you don’t have a choice what you get, it’s just thrown in?’ 
Simon: ‘Yeah but there’s always potatoes and onions and staple things, that’s part of 
the joy, it’s interesting new things arrive’.61 
In our research, these ordinary concerns about when and where choice is a good thing, 
and the degree to which ‘ethical’ considerations can or even should enter into everyday 
consumer choice, sometimes breakout into more explicit discussions of the ‘politics’ of 
choice and responsibility. This brings us to the second point we want to make about the 
ways in which people talk about the responsibilities that often come attached to 
consumption practices. People routinely express a sense that they can’t be expected to ‘do 
everything’ on the grounds of time, resources, and other practicalities. But sometimes 
they also explicitly raise doubts whether all this should be thought of as part of their 
responsibility at all:  
Arun: ‘We look upon life and enjoy it, and try and have some ethical stuff there as 
well so if you’re too worried about it you’re going to end up just not eating anything.’ 
Rachel: ‘Or going anywhere…’ 
Arun: ‘Yeah exactly, you wouldn’t want to leave your house.’ 
Simon: ‘But if everybody was 10% better that would be enough to make it better all 
round.’ 
John: ‘Why do we have to do it?  Why doesn’t the government do it?  Why do we 
have to pay more on products that are bad?  Why can’t they legislate?’ 
Michael: ‘Because the lobby groups.  Too many other interests.’ 
John: ‘Other countries don’t.  We just eat shit!  We eat shit and pay less for it.’ 
Rachel: ‘They could subsidise organic faring much more than they do.’ 
John: ‘The subsidies for organic farming in Germany are huge.  But it’s our own fault 
sometimes, we bought the shit, we buy it.’ 
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Michael: ‘The thing is it’s like ultimately the government should have a responsibility 
to make sure that people are safe and healthy and all that and they kind of I don’t 
know whether they think they do their best but there are so many powerful lobby 
groups, I don’t know whether it’s the sugar industry, the fat industry, the tobacco 
industry, the petrol industry and they just lobby and they just give…’
62
 
Here and elsewhere in our focus groups, discussion of the practical limits of people’s 
capacity to act on the ‘ethical’ demands being addressed to them as ‘consumers’ (i.e. of 
whether they can act ‘responsibly’) develops into an explicit consideration of whether all 
this is their responsibility at all (i.e. into a reflection on whether these things should be 
matters of personalised responsibility at all). Or, to put it another way, we see here people 
delineating the scope of their own activities that they feel able and willing to subject to 
certain sorts of moral reflexivity. Sometimes, people cope with the moralised address 
surrounding consumption by adopting rhetorical modes of irony, denial, regret, excuse-
making, or justification, all of which leave the content of the moral demands 
unchallenged. But sometimes we can catch them contesting the idea that consumption 
habits should be regarded as bearing these sorts of moral burdens in the way that is 
increasingly expected of them. One could easily interpret this as a means by which 
people displace and deny responsibilities that they should, ideally, be willing to 
acknowledge. That’s what lots of policy and academic research is inclined to do. But this 
seems to us to be a response that itself evades what might be most challenging about 
these sorts of ‘opinions’ and ‘attitudes’, which are after all often well-informed and 
carefully reasoned. In much of this talk, there is an implication that the ascription of 
responsibility to consumers is neither practically coherent nor normatively justifiable in 
quite the obvious way that many ‘experts’ have come to assume.  
 
 
 
 
5). Conclusion: Whose ‘Responsibility’?  
In this chapter, we have suggested that, try as we might, it’s actually quite difficult to find 
the archetypal individualised, rational, egoistical consumer idealised by rational choice 
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theorists and bemoaned by critics as an unwelcome sociological fact. You can’t actually 
find them in pure form even in what is supposed to be ‘best-case’ neoliberal policy 
discourse – there you find individual consumers burdened with all sorts of responsibilities 
to act virtuously for the common good. You certainly can’t find them in the discourses 
and campaigns of consumer activists, development charities, and sustainability think-
tanks, who come up with creative models of consumer choice which are likewise 
overflowing with all sorts of social, publicly minded virtues. Between them, this set of 
actors combine to frame consumption as bearing all sorts of moral burdens – as an arena 
saturated with questions of responsibility. When you do empirical work on ‘consumers’, 
you don’t find the mythical consumer either; people talk about their consumption habits 
and their roles as consumers as an attribute of their identities as mums and dads and sons 
and daughters and brothers and sisters and friends and lovers and workmates and bosses 
and comrades; as Christians and Socialists, Councillors and Counsellors, Teachers and 
Pensioners.   
 
We have argued that choice has become an object of ‘government’, and of public debate 
more broadly, by being problematized in a register of responsibility. This means that 
narratives of neoliberalism, individualization, and the like should be treated with some 
scepticism. Consumer choice, these days, comes with all sorts of responsibilities 
attached: to be healthy and nice to others, to care about distant strangers and future 
generations and trees and birds. Far from being constituted as a realm of amoral self-
interest, contemporary practices and discourses of consumption and consumerism are 
utterly saturated in moral significance. They seek to ‘make up persons’ that should be, it 
appears, capable of choosing wisely and magnanimously in the interests of all sorts of 
others. But there is no single, overarching ‘neoliberal’ model of individualized, egoistical 
choice being projected; consumer choice is wrapped around with all sorts of collective 
and inter-subjective responsibilities.  
 
Caught between the idea that providing information to individual consumers is a way of 
enabling them to act on their own preferences for more responsible futures, and the idea 
that changing consumer behaviour might require more than just providing lots of 
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information, what remains difficult for research concerned with governing consumption 
is to imagine people as citizens in anything other than the most perfunctory sense. This 
marks a failure of imagination in a research field that continues to conceptualise the 
political field as a realm of policy, regulation, and governmentality, rather than one of 
mobilisation, participation, and contestation. A great deal of research on contemporary 
consumption focuses on questions of whose responsibility it should be to act to reduce 
harmful patterns of behaviour: are the key agents of change consumers, or governments, 
or business, or the media, or NGOs, or professional bodies or religious bodies?
63
 As we 
have already suggested, what policy- and governance- oriented research seems unable to 
acknowledge – unable to hear – is the degree to which citizens, not consumers, are able to 
articulate sceptical questions about just whose definition of responsibility comes to 
dominate public discussion and insinuate itself into their own practices through diverse 
mediums of the ethical problematization of everyday consumption.  
 
We think it might be worth pausing awhile to ponder this question of whose 
‘responsibility’ it is that shapes public discourse around the problems of consumption. It 
suggests two lines of critical investigation that might reorient questions of consumption 
and governance in a more citizenly, democratic direction. Firstly, the question of whose 
‘responsibility’ suggests a line of political investigation. We have already seen that this 
form of intervention actively contests the scope of ‘permissible paternalism’ upon which 
state regulation of markets can be justified. But while it is relatively straightforward to 
come up with a justification of which preferences should be respected and which ones 
not, this is not the same as determining which other actors are ‘systematically better 
judges’ of people’s interests in those circumstances.
64
 And this question is particularly 
pertinent in the field of ethical and sustainable consumption, one defined by various 
forms of hard and soft expertise (from expertise about climate change to expertise about 
people’s most inner motivations). Secondly, the question of whose ‘responsibility 
suggests a line of ethical investigation. We have argued that the key question is not 
whether consumption is ‘ethical’ or ‘moral’ or ‘political’ or not: rather, what remains to 
be thought, when it comes to the analysis of consumption, is whether ‘responsibility’ is 
the only virtue that it is worth cultivating.  
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It is these two themes that run across the doubts and scepticism, the irony and humour 
expressed by our focus groups participants when put on the spot about the ethics of their 
own consumption behaviour. Perhaps they are struggling to articulate some doubts about 
the democratic validity of the experts who claim to know their interests better than they 
do but so often refuse to address them as citizens. And perhaps they are struggling to 
articulate a sense of the good life that cannot be reduced to the pieties of contemporary 
‘global responsibility’.    
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